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Abstract
Correlations related to quantum entanglement have convinced many
physicists that there must be some at-a-distance connection between
separated events, at the quantum level. In the late 1940s, however,
O. Costa de Beauregard proposed that such correlations can be ex-
plained without action at a distance, so long as the influence takes a
zigzag path, via the intersecting past lightcones of the events in ques-
tion. Costa de Beauregard’s proposal is related to what has come to
be called the retrocausal loophole in Bell’s Theorem, but – like that
loophole – it receives little attention, and remains poorly understood.
Here we propose a new way to explain and motivate the idea. We
exploit some simple symmetries to show how Costa de Beauregard’s
zigzag needs to work, to explain the correlations at the core of Bell’s
Theorem. As a bonus, the explanation shows how entanglement might
be a much simpler matter than the orthodox view assumes – not a
puzzling feature of quantum reality itself, but an entirely unpuzzling
feature of our knowledge of reality, once zigzags are in play.
1 Strange connections
One of the most puzzling things about quantum mechanics (QM) is en-
tanglement – the strange connection between quantum systems that allows
each to know something about what’s happening to the other, no matter
how far apart they may be. Erwin Schro¨dinger, who invented the term, said
that entanglement was not just one but “rather the characteristic trait of
quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical
lines of thought.”[1]
Schro¨dinger was discussing so-called EPR experiments, invented by Ein-
stein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) in 1935. A typical case is shown in Figure
1. Two particles (photons, in this version) are created together at a source,
and sent in different directions to experimenters Alice and Bob, who each
have a choice of several measurements they can perform on their particle.
And although each outcome is unpredictable on its own, when they choose
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Figure 1. EPR experiment with photons.
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matching measurements, the particles turn out to be perfectly correlated:
the two outcomes match 100% of the time. EPR used these correlations to
argue that the particles must carry “hidden instructions”, telling the parti-
cles how to behave for each measurement that Alice and Bob might choose
to perform. They concluded that standard QM was incomplete, because it
didn’t describe these hidden instructions.[2]
If EPR had been right about hidden instructions, quantum correlations
would be no more spooky than similarities between identical twins who
share the same genetic “instructions”. But in 1964 John Bell proved that
the quantum case is different. Bell’s Theorem shows that any hidden instruc-
tions would themselves have to rely on action at a distance, to be consistent
with the predictions of QM. (Many experiments have since confirmed these
predictions.)
Entanglement is this counterintuitive connection between Alice’s particle
and Bob’s, somehow able to guarantee certain correlations, no matter how
far apart Alice and Bob might be. They could be separated by lightyears,
or have the mass of a planet between them, but entanglement doesn’t care.
Whether this is explained by a framework in which separated objects aren’t
truly separated,1 or by allowing instantaneous communication at the level
1E.g., as in orthodox QM, a framework in which particles no longer exist in ordinary
space, but instead are linked directly to other particles in some vastly higher-dimensional
structure.
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of hidden parameters, this distant connection is termed “nonlocality”. And
it is now widely believed to be essential to the quantum world.
Nonlocality imperils more than just our sensibilities about action at a
distance. As David Albert and Rivka Galchen put it, in a recent piece in
Scientific American: “Quantum mechanics has upended many an intuition,
but none deeper than [locality]. And this particular upending carries with
it a threat, as yet unresolved, to special relativity—a foundation stone of
our 21st-century physics.”[3]
2 The Parisian Zigzag
Back in 1935, thirty years before Bell’s Theorem, it still seemed “obvious”
that there could be no action at a distance. As Schro¨dinger put it at that
time, “measurements on separated systems cannot directly influence each
other – that would be magic.”[4] The EPR argument for “hidden instruc-
tions” assumed that Alice’s choice of measurement cannot influence Bob’s
particle, and vice versa.
But a decade later, in post-war Paris, a young French graduate student,
Olivier Costa de Beauregard, spotted an interesting loophole in EPR’s rea-
soning. He realized that Alice’s choices could affect Bob’s particle indirectly
– so without action at a distance – if the effect followed a zigzag path, via
the past. Alice’s choice could affect her particle “retrocausally”, so to speak,
right back to the common source, in turn correlating Bob’s particle with
Alice’s choice (and vice versa).[5]
Unfortunately for Costa de Beauregard, his thesis advisor was Louis
de Broglie, one of the giants of early quantum theory (and a prince, to
boot!) For several years, de Broglie forbade his student to publish his strange
idea – relenting only when Feynman published a famous paper describing
positrons as electrons zigzagging backwards in time. Despite the Feynman
factor, however, Costa de Beauregard’s proposal made no impact among the
Copenhagen-minded physicists of the day. (Most of them thought that Bohr
had already dealt with the EPR argument.)
Ironically, one of the few anti-Copenhagen heretics in those days was
the young John Bell, whose conviction that EPR were making an important
point was to lead him to his own famous reason for thinking that Einstein
must nevertheless be wrong. As Bell himself put it, many years later: “For
me it is so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments carry
with them programs [i.e., “hidden instructions”], which have been correlated
in advance, telling them how to behave. This is so rational that I think that
when Einstein saw that, and the others refused to see it, he was the rational
man. The other people, although history has justified them, were burying
their heads in the sand. . . . So for me, it is a pity that Einstein’s idea
doesn’t work. The reasonable thing just doesn’t work.”[6]
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In the decades after Bell’s Theorem, a few writers noticed that Costa
de Beauregard’s loophole also applied to Bell’s reasoning. As Bell himself
makes clear, his result requires the assumption that Alice and Bob’s mea-
surement choices don’t affect the prior state of the particles. If we allow such
retrocausality – if Alice’s and Bob’s choices affect their particles’ common
past – then Bell’s argument for action at a distance is undermined.
This loophole receives little attention, and remains poorly understood.
Our purpose here is to throw some light on the idea, by proposing a new
way to explain and motivate it. We exploit some simple symmetries to
show how Costa de Beauregard’s zigzag would need to work, to explain the
correlations at the core of Bell’s Theorem. As a bonus, the explanation shows
how entanglement might be a much simpler matter than the orthodox view
assumes – less a puzzling feature of quantum reality itself, than an entirely
unpuzzling feature of our knowledge of reality, once the zigzags are in play.
It also shows how one of the intuitive objections to retrocausality – that it
would lead to time-travel-like paradoxes – can be avoided very easily.
An important note about terminology, before we begin. The central idea
of Costa de Beauregard’s proposal is that Alice’s choices may affect what
happens on Bob’s side of the experiment, without action at a distance, so
long as the effect goes via the past. Does this mean that the zigzag avoids
nonlocality? Yes in one sense, but no in another, for the term ‘locality’ is
ambiguous, once the zigzag option is in play. If ‘local’ means that Alice’s
choices can’t affect Bob’s simultaneous measurement at all, then the zigzag
model is not local. But if it means that every distant influence must be
explained by some contiguous chain of intermediate events in space-time
(with no faster-than-light individual links), then zigzags are local.
Normally, these two meanings of ‘locality’ would be thought to coincide,
but they come apart in zigzag models. To avoid confusion, we shall avoid
the term altogether, from now on. But we note that it is the second sense
of nonlocality – fundamental faster-than-light processes – that offends both
old objections to action at a distance and new objections based on relativ-
ity. A great advantage of the Parisian zigzag, if it works, is that it avoids
nonlocality in this sense.
3 Alice through the looking glass
3.1 Polarizing cubes
Let’s begin with some more details about the kind of experiment depicted
in Figure 1. The devices that Alice and Bob control are intended to be
polarizing cubes. Classically, such cubes separate the polarization compo-
nents of the incoming light. Each cube can be set at an arbitrary angle, and
any incoming light whose polarization matches the chosen angle will pass
straight through. But any incoming light with a polarization perpendicular
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to this chosen angle will reflect off the line drawn in the center of the cube,
and change direction.
Generally, then, in the classical case, the cube will split one incoming
beam into two outgoing beams. The exceptions are the cases in which
incoming beam is already polarized along (or perpendicular to) the setting
angle of the cube. In those cases, 100% of the outgoing light lies in a single
beam.
For future reference, we note that such a cube can also be used in reverse,
to “splice” two suitably polarized (and phase-locked) beams into a single
beam. Splicing is simply the time-reverse of splitting, and its possibility
follows from the fact that classical electromagnetism is time-symmetric.
However, this “splitting” of classical electromagnetic waves does not ex-
tend to the low-energy limit introduced in quantum theory. In this limit,
we encounter particle-like packets called “photons”. When the experiment
of Figure 1 is conducted with a single pair of photons, each of these pho-
tons is found entirely on one path or the other, at the relevant wing of the
experiment.2 This difference between the quantum and classical cases is
crucial to entanglement and the case for nonlocality. Bell’s Theorem, for
example, turns entirely on the correlations between these “discrete” single-
photon outcomes, on the two sides of experiments such as that of Figure 1.
There are no such discrete phenomena in the classical case.
For fully entangled photons, as in Figure 1, the strange correlations
between Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are masked by a curious feature: each
individual outcome appears to be completely random. No matter what
setting Alice chooses, she always finds a 50% chance of measuring her photon
on each of her two possible outputs (A). The same goes for Bob’s outcome
B. It’s only when they compare notes, after the fact, that the strange
correlations become apparent.
3.2 Into the mirror
With these preliminaries in place, let’s now stand Figure 1 on top of a mirror,
as shown in Figure 2. In the mirror we can see the reflection of Alice and her
half of the experiment. (There is no mirror under Bob’s half.) Now focus
on this reflection of Alice and her half of the experiment, and combine it
in your mind’s eye with Bob’s half of the original figure. This combination
(reflected Alice, plus Bob) looks exactly like the spacetime diagram of a
different experiment – one in which a single photon passes from Alice to
Bob, going through two polarizing cubes.3
2The probability of finding a photon on each path may still be said to “split”, thus
matching classical predictions in the many-photon limit, but our concern will be in making
sense of these experiments at the level of single photons.
3To make this trick work, we have to be careful to place the far righthand corner of
the mirror at the point on Figure 1 where the entangled particles are created.
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Figure 2. Alice through the looking glass.
To avoid confusion we’ve reproduced this new one-photon experiment as
Figure 3. Reflection in the mirror corresponds to time-reversal, so we have
named Alice’s time-reversed counterpart ‘Ecila’. (Ignore the orange dots for
the moment.)
3.3 The one-photon experiment
This new experiment (Figure 3) is not some impossible permutation of the
original – it’s a perfectly valid experiment, which we can actually carry
out. But it is unusual in one respect, and this oddity will play a crucial
role in the use we want to make of the experiment. Normally, if we were
performing a two-polarizer experiment of this kind, it would be natural to
take advantage of our ability to control the input channel (A′) at Ecila’s
end of the experiment. We (or Ecila herself) could simply choose to supply
photons on one channel or the other.
For Ecila’s end of Figure 3 be a proper mirror image of Alice’s end of
Figure 1, we need to do something different. We need to ensure that pho-
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tons are secretly supplied at random on one channel or other, to mirror the
unpredictable random outputs from Alice’s cube in Figure 1. We call this
random source ‘Erutan’, since it mirrors the action of Nature in choosing
Alice’s outputs in Figure 1.4
A′ = 0A′ = 1
B = 1B = 0
Figure 3. The one-photon experiment.
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Intriguingly, the correlations that one sees between Ecila’s inputs and
Bob’s outputs in real-life versions of Figure 3 are exactly the same as those
between Alice’s outputs and Bob’s outputs in Figure 1 – and they depend on
the choice of α and β in exactly the same way. In the case of Figure 3, how-
ever, the explanation of these correlations is thought to be straightforward.
4In Figure 1, we are stipulating that Alice is measuring which output path (A) the
photon ends up on. To mirror this behaviour in Figure 3, it must also be a determinate
matter that Ecila’s input photon arrives on one input path (A′) or other.
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The photon polarization τ is determined both by Erutan’s randomly-chosen
input at Ecila’s end of the experiment and by Ecila’s choice of the measure-
ment setting α. (More on the details of this below.) In turn, τ makes a
difference to the outcome at Bob’s end of the experiment, in combination
with Bob’s setting β.
Intuitively, the polarization τ connects events at one end to events at
the other, without action at a (temporal) distance, or any mysterious en-
tanglement. We simply have a single enduring property of the photon, τ ,
that ‘bridges the temporal gap’, and ensures in an entirely non-mysterious
fashion that the output channel of the photon at Bob’s end of the experi-
ment is related to its input at Ecila’s end of the experiment, in a way that
depends on the settings chosen by Ecila and Bob.
3.4 Backing out of the mirror
We want to use this simple, uncontroversial explanation from Figure 3 to
put some flesh on the bones of Costa de Beauregard’s zigzag, in Figure 1.
More precisely, we want to reach into the mirror in Figure 2, pull out the
τ -based explanation, and apply it to the original EPR experiment in Figure
1. We are exploiting the fact that, in effect, the mirror is already showing us
exactly what we need for a zigzag explanation of the correlations in Figure
1. We simply need to assign a property τ to the photon in Figure 1, before
it reaches Alice’s cube (matching the property of the photon in Figure 3,
after it leaves Ecila’s cube).
If we allow this property τ to be a constant throughout the zigzag path
from Alice to Bob in Figure 1 (just as it is a constant from Ecila to Bob in
Figure 3), then it plays exactly the same role in “propagating influence” to
Bob in one experiment as in the other. That is, it makes exactly the same
contribution to showing how a difference in Alice’s choice of the setting α
makes a difference to the photon in the region of Bob’s cube, as it does to
showing how a difference in Ecila’s choice of the setting α makes a difference
to the photon in the region of Bob’s cube. (For philosophers we might
say: The relevant counterfactuals are exactly the same!) So we have an
explanation – or, for cautious folk, an “explanation”! – of the correlations
in Figure 1, just as we do in Figure 3.
So we now have a picture of an EPR-style experiment that shows us
how the world needs to behave, to explain the Alice–Bob correlations via
Costa de Beauregard’s “retrocausal” proposal. Want to know what the
retrocausality needs to look like? Just think about what ordinary causality
looks like in Figure 3, according to the standard quantum picture, in the
special case in which the input channel is random. The control that the
retrocausal proposal needs to give to Alice is exactly the control that looks
like the standard “forward causal” story, when reflected in the mirror. We
want to see Ecila controlling τ after it leaves her cube (that’s the standard
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story), so we need to show Alice controlling τ before it reaches her cube –
and that’s the retrocausality, in the zigzag proposal.
3.5 Too good to be true?
At this point, readers may feel that our use of the mirror involves some
sort of sleight of hand, and that there are obvious difficulties for the zigzag
proposal. We can’t anticipate all such concerns, but we want to respond to
three objections:
1. If Alice can control τ over on Bob’s side of the experiment, why can’t
she send a signal to him? It is well-known that QM does not allow
signalling in the kind of experiment depicted in Figure 1, and we might
therefore suspect that this zigzag connection would be incompatible
with standard QM. (Typical causal channels can be used to signal,
after all.)
2. Why is Alice allowed to influence τ , when Bob seems to do no such
thing? (Discrimination against experimenters on the right!)
3. Isn’t the zigzag model just another version of the discredited “superde-
terminist” proposal?
We’ll come back to (2) in due course, and show how the zigzag proposal can
give Bob an influence, too; and we’ll come back to (3), say what it means,
and show why the objection is mistaken. But first let’s explain why Alice
can’t signal to Bob, even if she has retrocausal control of τ . To do this, we
need to go back into the mirror.
4 Causation without signalling
4.1 Can Ecila signal?
We are interested in whether Alice could signal to Bob in Figure 1, if she
had retrocausal control of τ . To answer this question, let us first ask the
corresponding question about Ecila. Is it possible for Ecila to signal to Bob
in Figure 3?
If Ecila could control the path chosen by the input photon, the answer
would be certainly be ‘Yes’. Fixing the path for a series of runs of the
experiment would give Ecila complete control over the polarization τ , and
Ecila could then vary τ to encode a message – she simply needs to send
enough photons with the same polarization, for each bit of her message, to
enable Bob to measure the polarization.
Suppose, for example, that Ecila’s photons come reliably from the lower
left channel. To ensure that some photons sent to Bob have polarization τ ,
Ecila sets α = τ . Bob experiments with various settings β, and discovers
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that the bias between his outputs is greatest when β = α or β = α + 90◦,
and disappears altogether when β = α + 45◦. This tells him that τ = α or
τ = α+ 90◦ (and the direction of the bias between outputs will distinguish
these possibilities).
Signalling remains possible even if Ecila doesn’t know which channel her
photons are arriving from, so long as they all arriving from the same channel.
In fact, it is enough that there is a reliable bias, so that one channel reliably
has higher probability than the other. Bob can still detect that Ecila’s
setting is either α or α+ 90◦, by looking for the setting of his polarizer that
produces maximum bias in his outputs. And this information is enough to
carry a signal. (For example, “α = 0◦ or α = 90◦” could mean “0”, while
“α = 45◦ or α = 135◦” means “1”.)
However, when Ecila’s input photon is supplied by a hidden randomizer,
with no bias between the two input channels, this kind of signalling becomes
impossible. (As we have specified above, the randomizer Erutan acts as a
mirror image of Nature.) If Ecila chooses setting α in this case, each photon
sent to Bob has equal probability of having polarization α (if the input came
from the lower left), or α+90◦ (if the input came from the lower right). Even
if Bob happens to set β = α he cannot tell that he has done so, because his
outputs display no bias, thanks to the random and hidden input at Ecila’s
end of the experiment.
With the randomizer in place, then, Ecila’s choice of the angle α does
not give her enough control to send a signal to Bob. It might be thought
that she has lost control of the polarization τ altogether, but this is not
so. She retains enough control to restrict the photon to just two possible
polarizations (α or α + 90◦). Intuitively, then, Ecila has a causal influence
on the polarization τ , without being able to use that influence to signal to
the future – and the fact that she still has causal influence continues to play
a crucial role in the intuitive explanation of the correlations that obtain
between her inputs and Bob’s outputs.
4.2 No signalling, with mirrors
Now that we know why Ecila can’t signal to Bob, despite having some
control of τ , we can see why the same is true of Alice. The control of τ
that the zigzag model gives to Alice is exactly the control of τ that Ecila
retains in Figure 3. As in that case, it is control, but it doesn’t permit
signalling. So there is no conflict on this score between the zigzag model
and the prohibition of signalling in Figure 1 in orthodox QM.5 (This explicit
5Note that since Ecila’s inability to signal is linked to the fact that Erutan supplies
symmetric inputs, an analogous claim must be true of Alice. In the particular two-photon
experiment to which the mirror symmetry applies, the prohibition of signalling in orthodox
QM must be linked to the fact that the Born Rule guarantees that Alice’s outputs are
similarly symmetric.
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causation-without-signalling is comparable to orthodox QM’s description of
“quantum steering” in these same cases.)
4.3 Generalised no-signalling?
This explanation shows why Alice cannot signal in this particular two-
photon experiment, despite the retrocausal control provided by the zigzag
model. Can the explanation be extended to other possible entangled states?
If the zigzag model itself is to be extended to other entanglement experi-
ments, we should hope that the no-signalling condition will also generalize.
The general issue has recently been raised by Wood and Spekkens [7], who
note that causation-without-signalling is logically possible in such causal
models, but typically requires what they term “fine-tuning”.
In the above example, as we noted, this so-called fine tuning turns out
to be naturally enforced by a symmetry between the outputs (in the case
of Alice) or the inputs (in the case of Ecila). The same symmetry has
been shown to explain no-signalling for every maximally entangled state
[8], not merely the one considered here. An interesting open question is
whether other natural symmetries (time-symmetry, Lorentz-symmetry, etc.)
are available to supply the necessary “fine-tuning” for partially entangled
states. Resolution of this question must await a hidden variable model rich
enough to encode all such states, although one promising framework can be
found in [9].6
5 What about Bob?
As it stands, the zigzag explanation of the Alice–Bob correlations in Figure
1 shows an absurd spatial asymmetry: Alice has retrocausal control, but
Bob does not. If the proposal is to have any claim to be taken seriously, this
asymmetry will have to go.
In principle, there are three ways this might be done. One approach
would be to double up the properties of the photon, so that there is a
property τa controlled by Alice from the left, and a different property τb
controlled by Bob from the right. In effect, this is the approach taken by
the Two State Vector approach to QM, defended by Aharonov, Vaidman
and others.[11] This can explain the Alice–Bob correlations – it provides
two consistent explanations, in fact, depending on which end we start.7
A second approach would be to make do with a single τ that need not
be constant. If τ is controlled on the left by Alice and on the right by
6For further discussion about how retrocausal models interface with the Wood-
Spekkens fine-tuning argument, see [8, 10].
7Another version of this approach proposes an analogy with the Wheeler-Feynman
absorber theory of radiation, thinking of τb by comparison with the advanced potential in
the Wheeler-Feynman picture. See [12, 13, 14] for details.
11
Bob, it must be allowed to change value in between, from τa to τb, to avoid
the inconsistencies that would otherwise arise when Alice and Bob choose
incompatible settings (i.e., when any single, fixed τ is incompatible with
either α or β). Remarkably, there is a simple rule that recovers the correct
correlations between Alice and Bob for models of this sort.[15]
Finally, one might take the approach that the polarization τ is not a
“real” parameter, but just a summary of the knowledge we have about the
system. This would correspond to what is now often called an ‘epistemic’
interpretation of τ . Such an approach is not directly relevant to our present
concerns.8 However, we note that there are at least two reasons for thinking
that any plausible epistemic interpretation of τ is also likely to be retro-
causal, at the level of its underlying ontology. One is the requirement of
time-symmetry; on this topic Pusey [16] has extended an argument of Price
[17] to the epistemic case. The second is that retrocausality provides one of
the few loopholes in the strongest argument against the epistemic view.[18]
Setting the epistemic interpretation of τ to one side, we note that a
bonus of either of the two previous approaches is that they remove a puzzling
time-asymmetry in Figure 3. This is not the asymmetry-of-signalling that
was removed by Erutan, as discussed in the previous section; with Erutan
present, neither Ecila nor Bob can signal to each other.9 But even with
Erutan, a further time-asymmetry remains if there’s only one fixed value of
τ . The standard assumption in this case is that Ecila still has control over
τ in this case (up to an additive factor of 90◦), while Bob does not.
For either of the time-symmetric approaches described in this section,
this puzzling asymmetry disappears. In these cases, whatever control Ecila
has over τa, Bob has the same control over τb. In other words, by restoring
the spatial symmetry of the zigzag in Figure 1, we automatically restore the
temporal symmetry of Figure 3. This reveals that the single-fixed-τ model
involves a new and apparently fundamental time-asymmetry, and it is an
advantage of the zigzag models that they remove it.10
8Namely, showing how Costa de Beauregard’s zigzag supports an epistemic understand-
ing of entanglement, even if τ itself is not interpreted in an epistemic fashion.
9Without Erutan, Ecila knows the input channel A′ before she chooses her setting α,
but Bob has no such access to B before he chooses his setting β.
10This issue is new to the quantum case, being a product of the discretization in the
single-photon limit. In the classical case, an initial randomizer mirroring Nature will
deprive Ecila of any determinate control over the output polarization of a classical light
beam at her end of such an experiment, restoring the symmetry between Ecila and Bob.
For further discussion of this point, see [17].
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6 Isn’t this just “superdeterminism”?
Some readers may feel that the proposal offered here is merely another ver-
sion of a familiar but unpopular proposal known as “superdeterminism”.11
What is superdeterminism? We can explain it by contrast to our own pro-
posal, referring to Figure 1. On the retrocausal view, Alice’s choice of angle
α influences a photon property τ on the segment of the photon’s worldline
between Alice’s measurement and the point in the past where the entangled
photon pair has been created.12
The superdeterminist proposes that this can be interpreted in a different
way. At the time when the photon pair was created, the random variable τ
was determined, and then sent to Alice (and Bob). This element of reality
forced Alice to choose a specific setting α (or, in more detail, forced every-
thing that happened close to Alice to result in a specific combination of the
outcome A and α), so that Alice was not really free to choose her setting.
In other words, the choice of setting was determined in the past, in such
a way to conspire to make everything look like a Bell violation but satisfy
no-signalling.
Superdeterminism is usually rejected for two reasons. First, it is felt to
require either some highly implausible conspiracy in the initial conditions of
the Universe, or some new realm of hidden variables with remarkable powers
to control the behaviour not only of human experimenters but also of the
various mechanical substitutes that might be used for choosing measurement
settings, apparently at random (e.g., the Swiss national lottery machine, as
Bell once proposed). Second, it is felt to conflict with “core assumptions
necessary to undertake scientific experiments.”[19] As Maudlin says, “all
scientific interpretations of our observations presuppose that [our choices of
settings] have not have been manipulated in such a way.”[20] This objection
may also be traced to Bell, who says this, for example:
“A respectable class of theories, including contemporary quan-
tum theory as it is practised, have ‘free’ ‘external’ variables in ad-
dition to those internal to and conditioned by the theory. These
variables . . . provide a point of leverage for ‘free willed experi-
menters’, if reference to such hypothetical metaphysical entities
is permitted. I am inclined to pay particular attention to theo-
11We are grateful to a referee at this point, and borrow her/his formulation of this
challenge in this paragraph and the next.
12The referee expresses this idea as the claim that the “photon property τ . . . somehow
travels back in time (whatever that means).” We agree that the notion of travelling back
(or forwards) in time is problematic, and therefore avoid it. (That’s why, when we spoke
of influence “propagating” in §3.4, we put the word in scare-quotes.) Instead we speak of
properties of world-lines during temporal intervals. What is distinctive about retrocausal
models, in this framework, is that they allow such properties to be influenced by choices
made by experimenters at both ends of the interval.
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ries of this kind, which seem to me most simply related to our
everyday way of looking at the world.”[21]
We agree with both of these objections to superdeterminism. By explaining
how the retrocausal proposal avoids them, we can explain how it differs from
superdeterminism.
Taking the second objection first, the retrocausal proposal accepts the
standard presupposition of all experimental science, namely that experi-
menters such as Alice and Bob are free to choose measurement settings.
Moreover, it accepts a standard operational definition of causality – a def-
inition long assumed in science, and refined and formalised in philosophy
over the past three decades – in which the notion of free agency plays a cen-
tral role. According to this so-called “interventionist” account of causality,
a variable X is a cause of a variable Y if and only if a free intervention on X
makes a difference to Y.13 (This approach to causality thus accords a central
and indispensable role to what Bell referred to in the passage above as “free
external variables”, and vindicates his view that this notion is central to
“our everyday way of looking at the world”, as well as in science.)
From this standard interventionist definition of causation, utilizing the
assumption of free control of measurement settings that superdeterminism
is rightly criticized for neglecting, it follows immediately that the direction
of causation in our models is the one claimed by the retrocausal reading.
Alice and Bob choose the measurement settings in the normal way, and these
settings in turn make a difference to the prior values of τ .14
The retrocausal proposal also differs from superdeterminism on the points
at issue in the first objection. The retrocausal model introduces no strange
new hidden variables to control measurement settings. To the extent that it
proposes new hidden variables, they are internal to the model (and, at least
in the version referred to in these paragraphs, of a familiar kind – e.g., a
new τ , controlled from the future). It may induce correlations in the initial
13See [22, 23, 24, 25] for further details, and [26, 27, 28] for discussions of the application
of this approach to the direction of causality and the possibility of retrocausality. A point
stressed in this literature (see particularly, e.g., [24, 23]) is that an adequate operational
definition of causation cannot be purely observational, if observation is understood in a
passive sense. In science, as in ordinary life, the notion of causation depends on the fact
that we intervene as well as observe.
14Some writers object that retrocausation cannot be “real” causation, claiming that it
is a matter of definition, or perhaps presupposed by relativistic spacetime, that true cau-
sation only works past-to-future. But this objection need not detain us here. What has
happened is that two criteria for causation – the interventionist criterion, and the time-
direction criterion – have turned out to conflict, in the kind of models here proposed. It is
then a terminological choice which criterion we take to be the more important. The possi-
bility of such a conflict was recognised long ago by the philosopher Michael Dummett.[29]
Dummett himself opts for the second criterion, and proposes “quasi-causation” for the case
involving control of something in the past. In Dummett’s terminology, these models for
QM involve retro-quasi-causation, not retrocausation – but they retain all the advantages
here described, under this new name. See [27, 26] for further discussion of this point.
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conditions of the Universe (or subsystems of it), but if so, these will not be
conspiratorial – on the contrary, they will be explicable within the model in
just the way that a standard forward-causal model explains correlations in
the future.15
7 Entanglement without spooks
Finally, back to what we promised at the beginning: an explanation of
how the Parisian zigzag offers a less spooky explanation of entanglement.
Once again, we will start with Figure 3, and then use the mirror to apply
the lessons of that case to Figure 1. Please pay attention to the orange
dots in Figure 3, that we earlier asked you to ignore. But now imagine
that – concerning a particular photon – you know that it is participating
in the experiment in Figure 3, but that you don’t know the setting or the
input/output channel, at either end.
Consider the photon at the upper orange dot, for example, and the vari-
ous possibilities for what Bob’s setting and outcome might be, immediately
in its future. Imagine that we are interested in the probability we should
assign to each outcome, conditional on the various possible settings. What
we know at this point is something rather bland: whatever the setting, the
probability of each outcome is 50%.
This is a ‘subjective’ or ‘evidential’ probability. If we had more evidence
– in particular, if we knew the setting and input channel at Ecila’s end
of the experiment – we would in general assign a different probability to
each of Bob’s outcomes, for each choice of his setting. For example, if we
learn that Ecila’s input and setting are A′ = 1 and α, respectively, then
we should now say that the probability of outcome B = 1, assuming Bob
chooses setting α, is 100%. Nevertheless, the bland 50% probabilities are the
correct probabilities, for the knowledge state we assumed here: ignorance of
the setting and input, at Ecila’s end of the experiment.
Exactly the same is true in reverse at the lower orange dot. There, too,
the probability of each input, for each assumption about Ecila’s settings,
is 50%, if we don’t know Bob’s setting and outcome. And there, too, the
probability changes, if we get additional evidence – if we learn about the
setting and outcome at Bob’s end of the experiment.
So in Figure 3 we have a perfectly time-symmetric story about how get-
ting information about one end of the experiment affects what probabilities
we are correct to assign at the other end of the experiment, in the kind of
knowledge-state we assumed. These evidence-based probabilities are time-
symmetric in this way, even if we are assuming that the underlying reality
15We discuss the distinction between superdeterminism and retrocausality further in
[30].
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is not symmetric – even if we think, as in the standard picture, that there
is a real property τ influenced by Ecila but not by Bob.
Using the mirror, we can now transfer this understanding to Figure 1. In
this case, the situation in which we are ignorant of the setting and outcome
at both ends looks perfectly normal, for an evident reason: they all lie in the
future! But the above analysis goes through in the very same way. Our best
description of each side of the experiment predicts bland 50% probabilities,
for each assumption about the choice of setting, until we learn about what
happens on the other side. At that point, we have new evidence, and can
update our probabilities on the opposite site.
The significance of this account is that these probabilities correspond
exactly to the information carried by entanglement. In the standard view,
this “entangled state” is thought to be a real property, that depends in a
mysterious way on what happens on the other side of the experiment – it
changes, when a measurement is made on the opposite side. But the mirror
shows us that this interpretation is not compulsory. We can understand
these probabilities in terms of changing evidence, just as we did in Figure 3.
Why is this understanding of entanglement so much harder to see in
Figure 1 than in Figure 3? Because in Figure 3 we think we understand why
these evidential probabilities work the way they do – the standard model,
treating τ as a real property, offers an explanation of the correlations on
which these probabilities are based. In Figure 1, there doesn’t seem to be any
explanation on offer, except the one that thinks of entanglement in terms of
a real property, mysteriously affected by choices made elsewhere. But once
the zigzag model is on the table (even in the left-to-right, unfair-to-Bob
version), it does the explanatory job. So it frees us to think of entanglement
in this easy, state-of-information fashion, just as we do in Figure 3.
The project of trying to make sense of entanglement started with EPR,
80 years ago. At the end of their paper, EPR note that while they take
themselves to have shown that the standard quantum state “does not provide
a complete description of the physical reality,” they have “left open the
question of whether or not such a description exists.” Nevertheless, they
say, “we believe . . . that such a theory is possible.”
Costa de Beauregard himself saw his zigzag proposal as an objection to
the EPR argument. It showed how there might be spacelike influence, with-
out action at a distance – thus undermining EPR’s main reason for assuming
that a measurement choice at one location could not affect an “element of
reality” at another location. In another sense, however, it amounts to a
vindication of EPR’s conclusion. If accepted, it shows not only that EPR
were right in thinking that the standard description is incomplete (because
it leaves out the zigzag mechanism) but also that they were right in thinking
that more complete theory is indeed possible.
Our contribution here has been show how easy it is to motivate Costa
de Beauregard’s zigzag, via the symmetries underlying our use of mirror
16
in Figure 2. We don’t take ourselves to have offered conclusive arguments
for the zigzag approach, of course, but we do urge that it deserves serious
attention. For the moment, the prevailing view of entanglement – that it
involves the mysterious connections between real properties that Schro¨dinger
derided as “magic” in 1935 – seems to rest on a considerable failure of
imagination. The Parisian zigzag offers an elegant alternative.16
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